A knowledge base is redundant if it contains parts that can be inferred from the rest of it. We study the problem of checking whether a CNF formula (a set of clauses) is redundant, that is, it contains clauses that can be derived from the other ones. Any CNF formula can be made irredundant by deleting some of its clauses: what results is an irredundant equivalent subset (I.E.S.) We study the complexity of some related problems: verification, checking existence of a I.E.S. with a given size, checking necessary and possible presence of clauses in I.E.S.'s, and uniqueness. We also consider the problem of redundancy with different definitions of equivalence.
Introduction
A knowledge base is redundant if it contains parts that can be removed without reducing the information it carries. In this paper, we study the redundancy of a propositional formula in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), that is, sets of clauses. A CNF formula is redundant if and only if one or more clauses can be removed from it without changing its set of models.
The problem of redundancy, and the related problem of minimization, are important for a number of reasons. First, removing redundant clauses leads to a simplification of the knowledge base. This may have some computational advantage in some cases (e.g., it leads to an exponential reduction of size.) Moreover, simplifying a formula leads to a representation of the same knowledge that is easier to understand, as a large amount of redundancy may obscure the meaning of the represented knowledge. The irredundant part of a knowledge base can instead be considered the core of the knowledge it represents.
Redundancy can be a negative characteristic or not, depending on how the knowledge base is obtained. Intuitively, a concept that is repeated many times (for example, in a book) is likely to be a very important one. If a formula results from the translation of something expressed by human beings, the fact that a clause is redundant is noteworthy, as it may indicate that this clause carries a piece of knowledge that is considered important.
On the other hand, redundancy may be a negative feature of a knowledge base, as it may result from an incorrect encoding or merging of several sources. In such cases, indeed, it is possible that the intended meaning of a clause is different from what the clause formally means (for example, the clause has been expressed using the wrong variable names.) Whatever the reason a clause is redundant, the fact that it is redundant is an hint of something, which may be either an high importance of the knowledge it express, or an hint of a mistake that has been made while building the knowledge base.
The problem of redundancy of knowledge bases may also be relevant to applications in which efficiency of entailment is important. Indeed, the size of a knowledge base is one of the factors that determine the speed of the inference process. While some theorem provers introduce a limited number of redundant formulae for speeding up solving, excessive redundancy can cause problems of storage, which in turns slows down reasoning. In particular, updates can increase the size of knowledge bases exponentially [CDLS99, Lib00] , and redundancy makes the problem of storing the knowledge base worst.
Algorithms for checking redundancy of knowledge bases have been developed for the case of production rules [Gin88, SS97] . In this paper, we instead study redundancy of propositional knowledge base in CNF form, that is, checking whether a clause in a set is implied by the others.
A related question that has been already investigated in the propositional case is whether a knowledge base is equivalent to a shorter one. This problem is called minimization of propositional formulae, and it has been one of the first to be analyzed from the point of view of computational complexity: its study begun in the paper that introduced the polynomial hierarchy [MS72] . A complexity characterization of this problem has been first given for Horn knowledge bases [Mai80, ADS86, HK93] ; afterwards, the problem has been tackled again in the general case [HW97, Uma98] . While the Horn case is now quite understood (the problem is NP-complete, using several different notions of minimality,) some problems regarding non-Horn formulae are still open. For example, the problem of deciding whether a formula is minimal (no other formula with less literals is equivalent to it) is trivially in Σ p 2 , but has only be proved coNP-hard quite recently [HW97] , and no other strict bound is known. What makes this problem difficult to handle is the fact that the considered formulae are not constrained to any particular form, such as CNF or DNF, or even NNF.
Redundancy elimination can be considered as a weak form of formula minimization: if a set of clauses is redundant, it is not minimal, as some Table 1 : Complexity results about redundancy clauses can be removed from it while preserving equivalence. On the other hand, redundancy elimination only allows for removal of clauses, so it is not guaranteed to produce a minimal knowledge base. For example, {x∨y, x∨¬y} is irredundant, but is equivalent to a shorter set: {x}. A related problem, not analyzed in this paper, is that of removing redundancy from a single clause, that is, removing literals from clauses rather than removing clauses from sets. The computational analysis of this problem, and of related ones, has been done by Gottlob and Fermüller [GF93] . The problem of redundancy elimination is relevant for at least two reasons. First, it seems somehow easier to remove redundant clauses, rather than reshaping the whole knowledge base. Indeed, removing redundant clauses can be done by checking whether each clause can be inferred by the other ones, while finding a minimal equivalent formula involves a process of guessing and checking a whole knowledge base for equivalence. Even for short knowledge bases, the number of candidate equivalent knowledge bases is very high.
A second reason for preferring redundancy elimination to minimization is that the syntactic form in which a knowledge base is expressed can be important. For example, some semantics for knowledge base revision depend on the syntax of knowledge bases. If a knowledge base is replaced with an equivalent one, even a single update can lead to a completely different result [Gin86, Neb91] .
Several problems are related to that of redundancy. The aim of checking redundancy is to end up with a subset of clauses that is both equivalent to the original one and irredundant. We call it an irredundant equivalent subset of the original set, or I.E.S. Note that an I.E.S. is a subset of the original set, and can therefore only contain clauses of the original set. This makes it different to a minimal equivalent set, which can instead be composed of arbitrary clauses.
The problems that are analyzed in this paper are: checking whether a set is an I.E.S.; checking the existence of an I.E.S. of size bounded by an integer k; deciding whether a clause is in some, or all, the I.E.S.'s; and checking uniqueness. Table 1 contains the complexity of these problems.
Since redundancy is defined in terms of equivalence (a formula is redundant if it is equivalent to a proper subset of its,) alternative definitions of equivalence lead to different definitions of redundancy. We have considered two definitions of equivalence, both based on the sets of entailed formulae. Namely, var-equivalence [CDSS97, LLM03] leads to an increase of complexity, while conditional equivalence [LZ] does not.
Redundancy and I.E.S.'s
In this paper, we study the redundancy of sets of propositional clauses. A knowledge base is redundant if it contains some redundant parts, that is, it is equivalent to one of its proper subsets. The definition therefore is affected by three factors:
1. the logic we consider; 2. what is "a part" of a knowledge base; 3. the definition of equivalence.
In this paper, we use propositional logic. Nevertheless, even in this simple case, we still have the problem of defining what is a part of a knowledge base. For example, we can consider a knowledge base a set of formulae, and a part is simply one formula. A restricted case is that of CNF: a knowledge base is a set of clauses, and a part is simply a clause. We could also consider generic Boolean formulae, and a part of them is any subformula.
We however only consider CNF formulae in this paper. We initially consider the usual definition of equivalence: other definitions are considered in a later section. We sometimes use formulae like a 1 ∧· · ·∧a m → b 1 ∨· · ·∨b k , which can be easily translated into the equivalent clauses ¬a 1 ∨· · ·∨¬a m ∨b 1 ∨· · ·∨b k . We also assume that clauses are not tautological.
Definition 1 A CNF formula is a set of non-tautological clauses.
Clearly, tautologies can be easily checked and removed, and do not change the complexity of the problems considered here. The redundancy of a single clause is defined as follows.
Definition 2 A clause γ ∈ Π is redundant in Π if and only if Π\{γ} |= γ.
The redundancy of a clause implies that the clause can be removed from the set without changing its meaning. In turns, the redundancy of a set of clauses can be defined as its equivalence to one of its proper subsets.
Definition 3 A set of clauses Π is redundant if and only if there exists
In propositional logic, this definition is equivalent to the following ones (proofs are omitted due to their triviality):
2. Π contains a redundant clause.
These definitions are equivalent in classical logic, but they are not in other logics: for example, in non-monotonic logic Π ′ |= Π may hold, but still Π ′ ≡ Π even if Π ′ ⊂ Π. In the same way, it can be that no part of the knowledge base is implied by the other ones, but still there exists a proper equivalent subset of it [Libb] .
A related definition is that of irredundant equivalent subset. Such sets result from removing some redundant clauses while preserving equivalence.
Definition 4 A set of clauses Π
′ is said to be an irredundant equivalent subset (I.E.S.) of another set of clauses Π if and only if:
The second point can be replaced by Π ′ |= Π for all monotonic logics. An alternative definition is that an I.E.S. is an equivalent subset of the original set such that none of its subsets has the same properties. Any set of clauses has at least one I.E.S., but it may also have more than one of them, as shown by the following example.
Example 1 Let Π = {a ∨ ¬b, ¬a ∨ b, a ∨ c, b ∨ c}. This set has two I.E.S.'s:
It is indeed easy to see that the first two clauses of Π are equivalent to a ≡ b, which implies that a ∨ c and b ∨ c are equivalent. It is also easy to see that neither a ∨ ¬b nor ¬a ∨ b can be removed from Π while preserving equivalence with it.
The set of clauses of this example can be used to show that a set of clauses may have exponentially many I.E.S.'s. Consider the set:
In words, Π n is made of n copies of Π, each built on its own set of three variables. While removing clauses from Π n , we have n independent choices, one for each copy: for each i we can remove either a i ∨ c i or b i ∨ c i . This proves that 2 n outcomes are possible, each leading to a different I.E.S. Since a formula may have more than one I.E.S., its clauses can be partitioned into three sets: the ones that are in all I.E.S.'s, the ones that are in some I.E.S.'s, and the ones that are in no I.E.S. The idea is that the first clauses are necessary (they cannot be removed from the set without changing its semantics), the last ones are useless (their removal is harmless), while the other ones are "useful but not necessary". We therefore give the following definitions. Note that useful clauses include all necessary ones, and that useless and useful are opposite concepts. In terms of knowledge, necessary clauses express knowledge in a succinct form, as they are not redundant at all. Useless clauses can instead be considered "strongly redundant": not only they can be removed; they can always be removed. In a sense, they are not saying anything useful from the point of view of the knowledge they express. On the other hand, their presence may be important at a meta-level. For example, the strong redundancy of a clause γ may indicate that the information it carries is very important. It may also indicate that the piece of knowledge it represents has been outdated by successive addition, but further additions to the knowledge base may require backing up to the part of knowledge we currently regard as useless. Either way, useless parts may in some cases be useful at a meta-level. Finally, useful but not necessary clauses express knowledge that the knowledge base contains in some other form, that is, these clauses represent "one possible way" of telling this information. As for all redundant clauses, they may tell that the knowledge they carry is regarded as important, but they may even indicate that mistakes has been made in the construction of the knowledge base, so that two clauses that are believed to say something different in fact do not.
Technically, checking whether a clause is necessary is easy, as it does not require cycling over all possible I.E.S.
Lemma 1 A clause γ is necessary in Π if and only if
Proof. If Π\{γ} |= γ, then γ belongs to all I.E.S.'s: this is an easy consequence of the fact that no subset of Π\{γ} can imply γ. What remains to prove is that Π\{γ} |= γ implies that there is an I.E.S. of Π that does not contain γ. We can build this I.E.S. as follows: we start from Π\{γ} and iteratively remove clauses that can be derived from it, until we obtain a set from which no clause can be removed. This is clearly an I.E.S., and it does not contain γ.
Checking inutility of a clause cannot be expressed with a simple condition like this one. This is shown by Theorem 5, which proves that the opposite problem of telling whether a clause is useful is Π p 2 -complete. As a result, the definition of uselessness cannot be expressed as a single entailment check (like the one for necessity) unless exponentially large formulae are used.
Any set of clauses has at least one I.E.S. Checking the existence of an I.E.S. is thus trivial. On the other hand, a set may have more than one I.E.S. Deciding uniqueness of I.E.S.'s for a specific set of clauses is important, as it tells whether there is a choice among the possible minimal representations of the same piece of information. For example, a trivial algorithm for producing an I.E.S. is that of iteratively removing the first clause that is implied by the other ones. This algorithm clearly outputs an I.E.S. However, other ones may exist, and be better either because are shorter (have less clauses), or because their structure make them more effective to use (for example, they are Horn or in a similar special form that makes reasoning with them easier.)
This problem is also of interest because uniqueness implies that all clauses are either necessary or useless. As a result, checking usefulness and inutility becomes the same and opposite problem of necessity, respectively. Therefore, they become much simpler than in the general case.
Clearly, if a set is irredundant, it has a single I.E.S. On the other hand, some sets may be redundant but have a single I.E.S. anyway. The following example shows such a set.
The first two clauses are in fact equivalent to a, which makes a ∨ c redundant. On the other hand, a ∨ c cannot be used to infer a. As a result, the only I.E.S. of this set is composed of its first two clauses.
The condition of uniqueness is formally defined as: there exists exactly one Π ′ that is a subset of Π and is irredundant. However, the following lemma shows an easier why to determine whether a set of clauses has a single I.E.S. 
Proof. If Π has a unique I.E.S., then its clauses are exactly the clauses that are in all I.E.S.'s of Π. Lemma 1 tells that the clauses that are contained in all I.E.S.'s can be expressed as Π N .
Let us now assume that Π N |= Π, and prove that Π N is the unique I.E.S. of Π. Since no clause of Π N is implied by the rest of Π, it is not implied by the rest of Π N either, which proves that Π N is an I.E.S. We only have to prove that Π does not have any other I.E.S. Assume, by contradiction, that
′ . This condition can be decomposed into γ ∈ Π N and γ ∈ Π ′ . The first formula implies Π\{γ} |= γ since Π N is the set of necessary clauses. The second formula, together with Π ′ |= Π, implies that Π ′ \{γ} |= γ. This is a contradiction, as Π ′ ⊆ Π.
The following condition is sufficient for proving that a set of clauses has more than one I.E.S. Intuitively, while removing redundant clauses from a set, we may arrive to a point in which we have a choice to make between removing one clause in a pair. If this is the case, this choice produces two different I.E.S.'s.
Proof. Since any set of clauses has at least an I.E.S., the same happens for Π\{γ 1 }. Let therefore Π ′ be an I.E.S. of Π\{γ 1 }. Since Π\{γ 1 } is equivalent to Π, this is also an I.E.S. of Π. It does not contain γ 1 because it is a subset of Π\{γ 1 }. We show that it necessarily contains γ 2 . Suppose it does not: then Π ′ ⊂ Π\{γ 1 , γ 2 } which, by assumption, is not equivalent to Π, contrarily to the claim that it is.
We have therefore proved that any I.E.S. of Π\{γ 1 } is an I.E.S. of Π that contains γ 2 but not γ 1 . For the same reasons, any I.E.S. of Π\{γ 2 } is an I.E.S.of Π that contains γ 1 but not γ 2 . As a result, the I.E.S.'s of Π\{γ 1 } and Π\{γ 2 } are all different. Since each set has at least an I.E.S., we have proved that Π has at least two I.E.S.'s.
This condition is however not necessary. Indeed, the choice between two clauses may show up only when some redundant clauses have already been removed. This happens for example when two clauses out of three have to be removed, like in the following set:
The clauses composing the first two formulae are necessary. Since a, b, and c are equivalent, and the last three clauses are equivalent as well. As a result, we can always remove two of them. This proves that the condition of the theorem (which requires two non-necessary clauses not to be removable at the same time) is false, while the set has more than one I.E.S.
Let us now show some properties that will be useful for the complexity analysis of problems related to redundancy and I.E.S.'s. Checking whether a specific clause is redundant is easy to characterize from a computational point of view, as it amounts to exactly one entailment test: Π\{γ} |= γ. On the other hand, results about the redundancy of a whole set are harder to obtain, as we have to make sure that the clauses we define do not interact to form redundancy when they should not. In other words, we can still use the fact that proving that Π\{γ} |= γ is coNP-complete, but this is a real reduction only if Π does not contain any other redundant clauses. The hardness proofs in this paper are indeed based on the following method:
the formula resulting from a reduction contains parts that are known to be irredundant. These parts will be then useful, because they express some constraints on the model, while they do not affect redundancy. Since the only parts that are "known to be irredundant" are the necessary clauses, this method can be used for problems about I.E.S.'s as well. The following definition shows how clauses can be made irredundant.
Definition 6
The irredundant version of a set of clauses Γ = {γ 1 , . . . , γ m } is defined as: The point of this definition is that Γ[C] is composed of necessary clauses only. The following lemma shows exactly how this can be proved. Γ is satisfiable. We prove that the last clause of Γ[C, a] is irredundant (the other ones have already proved to be so.) Since Γ is satisfiable, it has a model ω. By setting all c i 's and a to be true, we obtain the model ω ∪ {c 1 , . . . , c m , a}, which satisfy Γ[C]. This is not a model of ¬c 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬c m ∨ ¬a: as a result, the last clause is irredundant.
Lemma 4 For any set of clauses Γ containing no tautologies, the model ω i below satisfies all clauses of
This lemma is used not only in the proof of hardness of the problem of checking redundancy, but also for the proof of hardness of other problems (such as checking necessity of a clause.)
Complexity Results
In this section, we show the complexity results that are summarized in Table 1. The first result is about the complexity of checking whether a set of clauses is redundant.
Theorem 1 Checking irredundancy of a set of clauses is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership: we have to check whether, for any γ ∈ Π, it holds Π\{γ} |= γ. This can be done by guessing a model for each set Π\{γ}∪{¬γ}, which shows the problem to be in NP.
Hardness is an easy consequence of Lemma 5: a non-tautological set of clauses Γ is satisfiable if and only if Γ[C, a] is irredundant.
What this theorem proves is that checking irredundancy of a set of clauses is not harder, theoretically, than checking whether a single clause is irredundant. Although the problem looks harder than entailment, it is indeed the hardness proof the more complex part of the completeness proof (it requires using Lemma 5, which in turns requires Lemma 4.) This is because redundancy does not immediately allow expressing entailment (the irredundant version of a set of clauses has been introduced exactly for solving this problem.)
Let us now turn to the problems related to I.E.S.'s. The first problem is that of checking whether a set of clauses is an I.E.S. of another one. This problem clearly requires checking equivalence and irredundancy. The following theorem actually proves that the problem is hard for the class D p , which contains all problems that can be decomposed into a problem in NP and a problem in coNP.
Theorem 2 Given two sets of clauses Π and Π
Proof. Membership amounts to showing that Π ′ ⊆ Π (a polynomial task), that Π ′ |= Π (which is in coNP) and that Π ′ is irredundant (which we proved to be in NP). Therefore, the problem is in D p . Hardness is proved by reduction from the sat-unsat problem: given a pair of sets of clauses Γ, Σ , check whether the first one is satisfiable while the second one is not. This problem is D p -complete even if Γ and Σ do not share variables [BG82] , which we assume. Let C and D be new sets of variables in one-to-one correspondence with the clauses of Γ and Σ, respectively. Let a and e be two other new variables. Reduction is as follows: Given that a set of clauses can have more than one I.E.S., it is of interest to check the size of minimal I.E.S.'s, as it tells the amount of redundant information the theory contains, and also how much the size of the knowledge base can be reduced by deleting redundant clauses. The decision problem we consider is that of checking the existence of I.E.S.'s of size bounded by a constant integer. This problem can be solved by iterating over all possible I.E.S.'s. Such a procedure amounts to checking whether there exists a subset that is a I.E.S. and has the given size. The following theorem tells that this iteration cannot be avoided in general.
Theorem 3 Given a set of clauses Π and an integer k, deciding whether Π has an I.E.S. of size at most
Proof. Membership: the problem amounts to deciding whether there exists a subset of Π that is equivalent to it and of size at most k. Since the problem can be expressed as a ∃∀QBF, it is in Σ p 2 . Hardness is proved via a quite complicated reduction from ∃∀QBF. Let ∃X∀Y.¬Γ be a formula, where Γ = {γ 1 , . . . , γ m } is a set of clauses. This problem is Σ p 2 -hard, as it is the complement of the problem of deciding whether a ∀∃QBF, in which the matrix is a CNF formula, is valid [SM73] . We build a set Π as the union of the following sets of clauses:
Here, γ N j is obtained from γ j by replacing every positive occurrence of x i with ¬z i . The values of the constant k, r, and t are chosen as follows: if n is the number of variables and m the number of clauses of Γ, we set r = m + 1, k = (r + 2) · n + m, and t = k + 1.
We prove that ∃X∀Y.¬Γ is valid if and only if Π = Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ∪ Π 3 ∪ Π 4 ∪ Π 5 has an equivalent subset of size at most k.
The set Π is unsatisfiable because Π 5 is unsatisfiable. Therefore, we are looking for a subset of Π of size at most k that is unsatisfiable. Note that, removing even a single clause from Π 5 , it becomes satisfiable. Since Π 5 does not share any variable with the other subsets, it follows that no proper subset of Π 5 can contribute to the generation of unsatisfiability. Since t > k, if an unsatisfiable subset of size less than k contains clauses from Π 5 , they can be removed while maintaining unsatisfiability. As a result, while looking for an unsatisfiable subset of Π, clauses of Π 5 can be disregarded: these clauses are only used to guarantee that Π is unsatisfiable.
We have therefore proved that Π has an I.E.S. of size bounded by k if and only if Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ∪ Π 3 ∪ Π 4 has an inconsistent subset of size bounded by k. Let us therefore consider Π ′ ⊆ Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ∪ Π 3 and Π ′′ ⊆ Π 4 , and see what happens when Π ′ ∪ Π ′′ is an unsatisfiable set of at most k clauses. First, neither Π ′ nor Π ′′ is unsatisfiable alone, as both Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ∪ Π 3 and Π 4 are satisfiable (the first is satisfied by the model that evaluates to true all variables, the second by the model that evaluates to false all variables.) Second, if Π ′ does not imply all w i 's, then Π ′ ∪ Π 4 is satisfiable, and therefore Π ′ ∪ Π ′′ is satisfiable as well. There exists exactly two minimal subsets of Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ∪ Π 3 that imply w i :
These two sets have the same size. The number k has been chosen so that
More precisely, r + 1 = m + 2 other clauses are necessary to imply another x i or z i , which are shared with Π ′′ . Therefore, Π ′ must contain exactly one group among Σ i and Σ ′ i for any i, which amounts to n · (r + 2) clauses. The remaining m clauses can be taken from Π ′′ . Since Π 4 has size m, we can simply take Π ′′ = Π 4 . We have proved that Π ′ implies either x i or z i , for any i, but not both. Candidate unsatisfiable subsets are therefore in correspondence with truth assignments on the variables x i . Moreover, all variables w i are true, which makes Π 4 equivalent to j=1,...,m {γ N j }. If Π ′ contains x i , then ¬x i can be removed from any clause γ N j containing it, while ¬z i remains. The opposite happens if z i is in Π ′ . Either way, if a variable of {x i , z i } is in Π ′ , the other one is not mentioned in Π ′ , so we can assign it to false in order to satisfy as many clauses as possible (we are trying to prove unsatisfiability, so we have to test the most unfavorable possibility). What remains of Π 4 is the set Γ in which all variables x i has been removed, by assigning them either to true (if
. Therefore, the choice of including Σ i or Σ ′ i makes Π 4 equivalent to Γ after setting x i to some truth value. Therefore, Π has an unsatisfiable subset of size k if and only if ∃X∀Y.¬Γ is true.
Note that the choice of an unsatisfiable set Π is not necessary. Indeed, by adding a new variable u to all clauses, Π and all its subsets are made satisfiable. Since Π is now equivalent to u, one of its subsets can be equivalent to it only if, assigning false to u, leads to unsatisfiability, which has been proved to be equivalent to the QBF problem.
This theorem implies that, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, the problem of checking the existence of I.E.S.'s of size bounded by k is not in any class below Σ p 2 . As a result, the definition of the problem is not equivalent to a condition that contains "less quantifiers", unless an exponential blow-up is introduced. In other words, any condition that do not require checking exponentially sized formulae will contain an initial part "there exists something..." similar to the part "there exists Π ′ ..." of the original definition. Such a simpler equivalent condition would indeed imply that the problem is in NP or coNP. This is not the case for the problem of checking the membership of a clause to all I.E.S.'s, on the other hand: while the initial definition is "for all Π ′ ⊆ Π,...", we proved it equivalent to Π\{γ} |= γ. This simplification is however only possible because the problem is easier than what appears from the definition: while the definition of the problem can be expressed as a ∀∃QBF (implying that the problem is in Π p 2 ,) Lemma 1 proved that the problem is actually in coNP. The next theorem also shows that the problem is hard for that class (and cannot therefore be simplified to a condition that do not require a satisfiability/entailment test at all.) While deciding whether a clause is in all I.E.S.'s is in NP, the similar problem of deciding whether a clause is in at least one I.E.S. is complete for the class Σ p 2 , and is therefore harder. This result is somehow surprising, as these two problems have very similar definitions, and checking the existence of an I.E.S. containing a clause may look even simpler than checking all of them.
Theorem 4 Deciding whether a clause is necessary in a set (it is contained in all its I.E.S.'s) is
NP-complete. Proof. By Lemma 1, a clause is necessary if and only if Π\{γ} |= γ, and this problem is
Theorem 5 Deciding whether a clause γ is in at least one I.E.S. of a set of clauses
Proof. Membership is trivial: the problem can be expressed as the existence of a set Π ′ ⊆ Π containing γ that is equivalent to Π and irredundant. Hardness is proved by reduction from ∃∀QBF. We assume that the matrix of the QBF formula is the negation of a CNF: this problem is Σ p 2 -hard, as it is the complement of deciding whether a ∀∃QBF formula, in which the matrix is in CNF, is valid [SM73] . We prove that ∃X∀Y.¬Γ is valid (where Γ = {γ 1 , . . . , γ m }) if and only if w is in at least one I.E.S. of the following set Π:
This set is clearly unsatisfiable. Its I.E.S.'s are its unsatisfiable minimal subsets. Let us now show how a subset Π ′ of this kind is composed. If both x i and ¬x i are in Π ′ , they are enough to generate contradiction, so no other clause can be in Π ′ , otherwise the other clauses would be redundant. We have therefore found a first group of minimal unsatisfiable subsets of Π: those composed exactly of a pair {x i , ¬x i }.
Let us now try to build an unsatisfiable Π ′ ⊆ Π that contains w. Besides w, such set Π ′ can include i=1,...,m {w → γ i }, as well as a literal between x i and ¬x i for any i (but not both, otherwise the other clauses would be redundant). It is now evident that such set can be unsatisfiable only if, for the given choice of the x i 's, the set Γ is unsatisfiable. Thus, there exists an unsatisfiable subset of Π containing w if and only if Γ is unsatisfiable. What remains to prove is that any I.E.S. obtained by removing redundant clauses from Π ′ contains w, but this is an easy consequence of the fact that Π ′ \{w} is satisfiable.
The hardness result proves that, unlike the necessary condition, the definition of usefulness cannot be reduced to a simple entailment/satisfiability check, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses or some exponentially large formulae are used.
The problem of uniqueness amounts to checking whether a set of clauses has a single I.E.S. This problem can be solved without cycling over all possible subsets of clauses, as Lemma 2 proves that finding the set of necessary clauses suffices.
Theorem 6 Deciding whether a set of clauses Π has a single I.E.S. is
Proof. By Lemma 2, all we have to do is to check whether the set of necessary clauses Π N is equivalent to Π. In turns, the set of necessary clauses can be found by checking Π\{γ} |= γ for each clause γ ∈ Π. As a result, we perform a polynomial number of parallel calls to an oracle in NP (each one to check whether a clause is necessary) followed by a single other call (to check equivalence between Π N and Π.) By a well-known result by Gottlob [Got95] , the problem is in ∆ p 2 [log n]. We prove that the problem of uniqueness is ∆ p 2 [log n]-hard by reduction from the problem of odd satisfiability: given a sequence of sets of clauses (Π 1 , . . . , Π r ), each built on its own alphabet, such that the unsatisfiability of Π j implies that of Π j+1 , decide whether the first Π k that is unsatisfiable is of odd index, that is, k is odd.
For each set of clauses Π j , we need an additional set of variables C
] (e.g., a j ), if and only if Π j is unsatisfiable. Let j be an odd index between 1 and r. Define: 
Query Equivalence
The definition of equivalence that is most commonly used is that of logical equivalence: two formulae are equivalent if and only if they have the same sets of models. This definition is the same as the following one. This definition is formally equivalent to the previous one, but emphasizes a common use of propositional formulae: if a formula Π 1 represents a piece of knowledge, reasoning is usually (but not always) done in terms of queries. In turns, querying a knowledge base means checking whether some facts follow from it or not. Formally, given a piece of knowledge represented by a formula Π 1 , querying it means checking whether a fact represented by another formula Γ follows from it, that is, whether Π 1 |= Γ. If the above condition on Π 1 and Π 2 holds, we can say that Π 2 represents the same knowledge as Π 1 as these two formulae are indistinguishable from the point of view of reasoning.
This new definition of equivalence is of interest because it can be extended in many directions. Namely, if not all formulae are possible queries, it does not coincide any more with logical equivalence. Two cases have been considered in the past:
1. we are only interested in queries that are in a particular syntactic form, for example, the Horn form [CD97];
2. we are only interested in formulae about a subset of variables [CDSS97, LLM03] .
On the other hand, we may also interested in a set of queries that strictly include the set of propositional formulae. This is the case, for example, when queries can be conditional formulae like Γ > Σ, which means "if Γ were true, would Σ holds?" 3. we are interested into all possible conditional queries [LZ] .
Intuitively, Γ > Σ is entailed by Π if and only if Σ follows from the formula that is obtained by revising Π with Γ. This motivates this kind of equivalence: two formulae are equivalent if and only if they are logically equivalent, and remain so regardless of updates. This kind of equivalence is related to strong equivalence in logic programming [LPV01] , and has been defined for propositional logic by Liberatore and Zhao [LZ] .
We call any form of equivalence that is based on a particular set of consequences query equivalence (this name has been used by Cadoli et al. [CDSS97] for the definition based on a subset of variables, but it is somehow inappropriate as other sets of queries make sense.) The two forms of equivalence above (based on considering subsets of propositional formulae) are called Horn equivalence and var-equivalence, respectively. The form of equivalence based on conditional statements is instead called strong equivalence or conditional equivalence.
Since redundancy is defined in terms of equivalence (a set is redundant if and only if it is equivalent to a proper subset of its,) using a definition of equivalence that is different from the logical one leads to different properties and results. Using query equivalence, redundancy tells which clauses are really necessary w.r.t. a given set of queries. We only consider two kinds of equivalence: var-equivalence and conditional equivalence. The two corresponding forms of redundancy are called var-redundancy and conditional redundancy.
Var-Redundancy
Var redundancy is defined in the same way as logical redundancy, but using var-equivalence instead of logical equivalence. This kind of equivalence is called query equivalence by Cadoli et al. [CDSS97] and var-equivalence by Lang, Liberatore, and Marquis [LLM03] . We prefer the second name, and reserve the first one for the more general concept of equivalence based on an arbitrary set of queries. Formally, var-equivalence is defined as follows. If V is the set of all variables, ≡ and V ≡ coincide. On the other hand, if V is only composed of a subset of the variables, these two kinds of equivalence are different. In particular, while checking equivalence is coNP-complete, checking var-equivalence is Π p 2 -complete [LLM03] . As a result, checking varredundancy is expected to be different from redundancy, and to be harder. The following equivalent condition of var-equivalence simplifies the subsequent proofs. Proof. Follows from the fact that any formula over variables V can be expressed as a conjunction of cubes over V .
This theorem simply tells us that equivalence can be checked by looking at the cubes over V , rather than checking all possible formulae. This theorem also implies that all formulae that are var-equivalent are also var-equivalent to some formulae that only contain variables of V : one such formula is the disjunction of all cubes over V that are implied. This formula is called the forgetting of the variables that are not in V [LLM03] .
Since cubes correspond to models, a similar property based on partial models holds. To this aim, we have however to give a special definition of model satisfaction. The fact that var-redundancy is different from redundancy can be seen from the following formula using V = {x}:
Π is logically irredundant. However, the clause y is var-redundant in Π w.r.t. V = {x}: if queries are restricted to formulae built on the variable x only, then the clause y is not needed. Note that var-redundancy does not depend only on the variables a clause contains: the clause γ = ¬y is not var-redundant in the set Π = {x ∨ y, ¬y} w.r.t. V = {x} even if it does not mention any variable in V .
Definition 10 (Var-Redundancy of a Set) A set of clauses is var-redundant if and only if it contains a clause that is var-redundant in it.
Since entailment is monotonic, var-irredundancy of all clauses of Π is the same as the non-equivalence of Π with one of its proper subsets. The problem is therefore not harder than the problem of equivalence, as a linear number of equivalence checks that can be done in parallel are as hard as a single one.
Since var-equivalence is harder than logical equivalence (Π p 2 -complete [LLM03] vs. coNP-complete), we expect var-redundancy to be harder than logical redundancy. However, it is also easy to prove that redundancy is in the same class of the corresponding equivalence problem, as it amounts to solve a number of equivalence problems that can be done in parallel. Proving that var-redundancy is hard for the same class, instead, is slightly more difficult. The following property is useful.
Lemma 6 A clause γ is var-redundant in Π w.r.t. V if and only if any var-model of Π\{γ} over V is a also a var-model of Π.
If a clause γ only contains variables of V , checking redundancy is relatively easy, as it amounts to checking whether γ is logically implied by the other clauses. As a result, the Π p 2 -hardness of the problem of redundancy of a single clause can only be proved if the clause contains some literals not in V . Assume ∀X∃Y . Σ. This assumption can be rephrased as: all partial models over X can be extended to form a model of Σ. All models over X can then be extended to form a model that satisfies both (¬a∨Σ) ∪{a} and (¬a ∨ Σ) by simply adding the evaluation of a to true, that is, all var-models of ¬a ∨ Σ are var-models of (¬a ∨ Σ) ∪ {a}.
Theorem 9 Checking whether a clause is var-redundant w.r.t. V in a set is
Assume ∃X∀Y . ¬Σ. We prove that (¬a ∨ Σ) ∪ {a} and (¬a ∨ Σ) are not equivalent. Let ω X be the model over X such that Σ is false regardless of the value of Y . We show that ω X is a var-model of (¬a ∨ Σ), but not of the other formula. Extending the model ω X with the model that sets a to false and Y to any value, we obtain a model of (¬a∨Σ) simply because all clauses in this set contains ¬a.
Let us now prove that ω X is not a var-model of (¬a ∨ Σ) ∪ {a}, i.e., it cannot be extended to form a model of (¬a ∨ Σ) ∪ {a}. By the contrary, let ω Y be the partial model of Y such that ω X ω Y ω a satisfies this formula. Since the formula contains a, the model ω a must set a to true. As a result, the formula can be reduced to Σ. This implies that there exists ω Y that extends ω X to form a model of Σ, contradicting the assumption.
The following theorem shows the complexity of var-redundancy of a set of clauses. This problem has the same complexity of var-redundancy of a single clause, as in the case of logical redundancy.
Theorem 10 Checking var-redundancy of a set of clauses is
Proof. Membership follows from the fact that a set is var-redundant if and only if Π\{γ} V ≡ Π holds for some clause γ ∈ Π. These queries can be done in parallel. Therefore, the problem is in the same class of the single test, which is in Π p 2 . Hardness is proved by showing that ∀X∃Y . Σ holds if and only if the following set Π is var-redundant w.r.t. V = X ∪ B ∪ C, where Σ = {γ 1 , . . . , γ m }. We assume, without loss of generality, that Σ contains at least two clauses, and it does not contain any tautological clause.
Each set Π i entails the clause c i → b i This is indeed the result of resolving all clauses of Π i together. As a result, c i → b i is a consequence of Π. Being composed of variables of V only, this clause must also be entailed by any var-equivalent formula.
All clauses of Π i are irredundant in Π. This is proved by showing that, removing one clause of Π i from Π, a new var-model is created. Since Π entails c i → b i , the following partial model cannot be extended to form a var-model of Π, as it evaluates c i to true but b i to false.
We prove that, removing a clause δ ∈ Π i , this model can be extended to form a model, that is, ω BC can be extended to form a model of Π\{δ}. Since m ≥ 2 by assumption, ω BC evaluates a variable c j to false, and the clause π is therefore satisfied. The model ω BC also satisfies all sets Π j with j = i. We therefore only have to prove that, removing a clause from Π i , the model ω BC can be extended to form a model of the other clauses of Π i .
c i → ¬a ∨ γ i : the model ω with ω(a) = true and ω(l j ) = false for any
¬a → b i : the model ω with ω(a) = false and ω(l j ) = false for any l j ∈ γ i is such that ω BC ω |= Π i \{¬a → b i }; l j → b i : we use the model ω with ω(a) = true, ω(l j ) = true, and ω(l k ) = false for any l k ∈ γ i with k = j. Indeed, ω BC ω |= Π i \{l j → b i }.
As a result, all clauses of Π i are irredundant in Π. In other words, Π is redundant if and only if π is redundant in Π.
Assume ∃X∀Y . ¬Σ. We prove that a is irredundant. This is proved by showing that Π\{π} has a var-model that Π has not. This var-model is ω X ω BC , where ω X is the value of X that makes Σ falsified, while ω BC evaluates all variables in B and C to true. This model can indeed by extended to form a model of Π\{π} by simply setting a to false. On the other hand, assume that there exists
Since π ∈ Π, and ω BC evaluates all c i 's to true, we have ω a (a) = true.
As a result, all clauses c i → ¬a ∨ γ i can be simplified to γ i . We can therefore conclude that ω X ω Y |= Σ, contrarily to the assumption.
Assume that π is irredundant in Π. We show that there exists ω X that falsifies Σ regardless of the value of ω Y . By assumption, there is a var-model of Π\{π} that is not a var-model of Π. Let ω X ω BC be such a var-model.
If ω BC (c i ) = false for some i, then ω BC |= π. Since ω BC is a var-model of Π\{π}, there exists ω such that ω BC ω |= Π\{π}. Since ω BC |= π, we also have that ω BC ω |= Π, contradicting the assumption that ω BC is not a var-model of Π. As a result ω BC (c i ) = true for all indexes i. Since c i → b i is entailed by Π i and, therefore, by Π\{π}, we can conclude that ω BC evaluates to true all variables of B ∪ C.
As a result, all formulae ¬a → b i and l j → b i are satisfied by ω BC . Moreover, c i → ¬a ∨ γ i simplifies to ¬a ∨ γ i , and π simplifies to a.
Since ω X ω BC is not a var-model of Π, then ω X is not a var-model of {¬a ∨ γ i } ∪ {a}, which is equivalent to Σ. In other words, ω X cannot be extended to form a model of Σ.
Conditional Equivalence
Conditional equivalence (or strong equivalence) of two formulae holds whenever the two formulae are equivalent and remain so regardless of updates.
This definition depends on how revisions of knowledge bases are done. If the semantics of revision is syntax-independent [Dal88] , then conditional and logical equivalence coincide. On the other hand, objections to the principle of the irrelevance of syntax have been raised [Fuh91, Neb91, BGMS99, Was01] , and some revision semantics that depend on the syntax exist. They are mainly motivated by the fact that the syntactic form in which a formula is expressed tells more than its set of models. In this section, we only consider the basic definition of revision by Fagin, Ullman, and Vardi [FUV83] and by Ginsberg [Gin86] .
Definition 11 Max(Π, Γ) is the set of the maximal subsets of Π that are consistent with Γ. Revision of Π with Γ is defined as follows:
We now give an equivalent characterization of this form of revision. Given a set of clauses Π, let S Π (ω) be the set of clauses of Π that are satisfied by the model ω.
Definition 12 (Satisfied Subset) The subset of Π satisfied by ω is:
The result of revision can be characterize in terms of the set of models of the result.
Lemma 7 The models of Π * Γ are exactly the models ω of Γ whose set S Π (ω) is maximal with respect to set containment.
Proof. By definition, only models of Γ have to be taken into account. The set S Π (ω) is the set of formulae of Π that are satisfied by ω. Since ω is a model of Γ, we have that S Π (ω) ∪ Γ is consistent. As a result, the only case in which ω is not a model of the revision is when this set is not one of those maximally consistent with Γ, that is, there exists a maximal Π ′ such that Π ′ ∪ Γ is consistent, and S Π (ω) ⊂ Π ′ . Since Π ′ ∪ Γ is consistent, it has models: let ω ′ be a model of Π ′ ∪ Γ. Since all clauses of Π ′ satisfy ω ′ , and Π ′ is maximally consistent, we have Π ′ = S Π (ω ′ ). This proves that ω is not a model of Π * Γ if and only if there exists ω ′ with S Π (ω) ⊂ S Π (ω ′ ).
We can now formally give the definition of conditional redundancy of a clause, and of a set of clauses. The definition of conditional redundancy of a whole set can be defined in two different ways: first, a set is conditionally redundant if it contains a redundant clause; second, a set is conditionally redundant if it is equivalent to one of its proper subsets. We use the first definition.
Definition 14 (Conditional Redundancy of a set of Clauses) A set of clauses Π is conditionally redundant if and only if it contains a redundant clause.
This definition is not equivalent to the other one. For example, the set Π = {a ∨ b, a ∨ ¬b, a ∨ c, a ∨ ¬c} does not contain any conditionally redundant clause, but is conditionally equivalent to its subset Π ′ = {a ∨ b, a ∨ ¬b}. This difference is caused by the fact that revision is a non-monotonic operator: most, but not all, non-monotonic logics show this phenomena [Libb] .
Lemma 7 tells that a clause is redundant if and only if its removal modifies the ordering on models defined by ⊆ on S Π (.). On the other hand, it may be that two models are incomparable before the removal of a clause and equal afterwards. As a result, the difference of the orderings caused is only a necessary condition to equivalence, not a sufficient one.
Lemma 8 If γ is irredundant in Π, then there exists two models ω and ω ′ such that the containment relation between S Π (ω) and S Π (ω ′ ) is different from that between S Π\{γ} (ω) and S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ).
Proof. Trivial consequence of Lemma 7: if the ordering is the same, then all revision results are the same.
This condition is however not a sufficient one, in general: indeed, it may be that the ordering is different only because two sets that are incomparable becomes equal. If this is the case, the result of revision is always the same. On the other hand, such a case is not possible if the two formulae only differ for one clause.
Lemma 9 γ is irredundant in Π if and only if there exists two models ω and ω ′ such that the containment relation between S Π (ω) and S Π (ω ′ ) is different from that between S Π\{γ} (ω) and S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ).
Proof. The "only if" part is Lemma 8. We only have to prove that, if the containment relation between S Π (ω) and S Π (ω ′ ) is different from that between S Π\{γ} (ω) and S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ), then γ is irredundant. If both ω and ω ′ satisfy γ, then its removal does not change the relationship between S Π (ω) and S Π (ω ′ ), as γ is removed from both. On the other hand, if none of these models satisfy γ, then the sets S Π (ω) and S Π (ω ′ ) are not modified at all.
The only remaining case is therefore that one of these two models satisfy γ while the other does not. Without loss of generality, assume that ω satisfies γ while ω ′ does not. As an immediate result, we have that S Π (ω) ⊆ S Π (ω ′ ), since the first set contains a clause the other one does not. Moreover, we have that
In other words, the only effect of removing γ is to remove γ from the set of clauses that are satisfied by ω, while the clauses satisfied by ω ′ are the same.
We prove that the inverse containment is not modified by the removal of γ. Formally, we prove that S Π (ω ′ ) ⊆ S Π (ω) if and only if S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ) ⊆ S Π\{γ} (ω).
1. If S Π (ω ′ ) ⊆ S Π (ω) holds, using the equations above we have that
, by using the equations above, we have that
We can therefore conclude that the only possible change of relationship between the clauses that are satisfied by ω and those satisfied by ω ′ is that
, while the set containment in the other direction is preserved.
Let Γ be the formula that has ω and ω ′ has its only two models. We prove that the revision by Γ is affected by the presence of γ. Formally, we show that Π * Γ is different from Π\{γ} * Γ. We have already shown that S Π (ω) ⊆ S Π (ω ′ ), and that the inverse containment is not changed by the removal of γ. Since the containment relation changes by assumption, we also have that S Π\{γ} (ω) ⊆ S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ). Two cases are possible: either S Π (ω ′ ) ⊆ S Π (ω) or not. Let us consider each case separately.
•
. As a result Π * Γ has ω as its only model. On the other hand, S Π\{γ} (ω) ⊆ S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ). As a result, ω and ω ′ are evaluated in the same way by S Π\{γ} (.). As a result, Π\{γ} * Γ has both of them as models.
, we have that ω and ω ′ are incomparable in Π. As a result, Π * Γ has both of them as models.
On the other hand, we have that S Π\{γ} (ω) ⊆ S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ), and therefore S Π\{γ} (ω) ⊂ S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ). As a result, ω ′ is strictly preferred over ω in Π\{γ}. As a result, Π\{γ} * Γ has ω ′ as its only model.
We have therefore proved the following: if the removal of γ changes the relationship between two models ω and ω ′ , then the only possible change is that
, while the inverse containment relationship is not changed. We have then proved that such a change leads to different results when Π and Π\{γ} are both revised by the same formula Γ. As a result, γ is irredundant.
This lemma proves that the irredundancy of a clause is related to the modification of the set containment of the sets of clauses that are satisfied by the models. On the other hand, this condition is only about the redundancy of a single clause. If we allow removing two clauses, the ordering can be modified while conditional equivalence is preserved.
Theorem 11
The following two sets of clauses are conditionally equivalent, but the ordering they induce are different, and all clauses of Π are irredundant.
Proof. We prove that Π does not contain any redundant clause. Its symmetry allows proving it for a single clause only. Let us therefore show that a ∨ b is irredundant. Consider the following revising formula Γ = ¬a. The maximal subsets of Π that are consistent with Γ are composed of exactly one clause between a ∨ b and a ∨ ¬b, and one clause between a ∨ c and a ∨ ¬c. As a result, Π * Γ = ¬a. Let us now consider Π\{a∨b} * Γ. The maximal subsets of Π\{a∨b} that are consistent with ¬a contains the clause a∨¬b, and one clause between a∨c and a∨¬c. As a result, all maximal subset contains a∨¬b, which is therefore in Π\{a ∨ b} * Γ. We can therefore conclude that Π\{a ∨ b} * Γ = ¬a ∧ ¬b. Since this is different from Π * Γ, the clause a ∨ b is irredundant in Π.
We now prove that Π ′ is conditionally equivalent to Π. Let ω and ω ′ be two models. If they both satisfy c or they both satisfy ¬c, the set of satisfied clauses are modified in the same way. On the other hand, if one of them implies c and the other one implies ¬c, then they are incomparable in Π, but equal in Π ′ . The only difference is therefore that some pairs of models are incomparable in Π but equal in Π ′ . As a result, the maximal ones are always the same.
While Π and Π ′ are conditionally equivalent, there exist two models that are compared differently in Π and Π ′ . Let ω and ω ′ be the models such that ω |= ¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c and ω ′ |= ¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ c. The sets S Π (ω) and S Π (ω ′ ) are not comparable: the first contains a ∨ ¬c but not a ∨ c, while the second contains the second one but not the first. As a result, the ordering is changed.
The following lemma makes the statement of Lemma 9 more precise: not only there is a pair of models whose ordering is modified: this ordering is modified in a very specific way.
Lemma 10 γ is conditionally irredundant in Π if and only if there exists two models ω and ω ′ such that:
Proof. If two such model exists, then we have that S Π (ω) ⊆ S Π (ω ′ ), since S Π (ω) contains a clause that is not in S Π (ω ′ ); on the other hand, since γ is the only clause that is in S Π (ω) but not in S Π (ω ′ ), removing it from both sets leads to S Π\{γ} (ω) ⊆ S Π\{γ} (ω ′ ). This result tells us that the removal of γ modifies the relationship between the set of clauses that are satisfied by ω and by ω ′ . By Lemma 9, this implies that γ is irredundant. Let us assume that γ is irredundant. By Lemma 8, there are two models ω and ω ′ such that the containment relation between S Π (ω) and S Π (ω ′ ) is affected by the presence of γ in Π. If ω and ω ′ evaluate γ in the same way (i.e., either both or none of them satisfy it), then removing γ modifies their sets S Π (.) in the same way (either γ is removed from both, or it is not in either already.)
As a result, either ω or ω ′ satisfy γ, but not both. Without loss of generality, we can assume that ω is the model that satisfy γ. As a result, we have that γ ∈ S Π (ω)\S Π (ω ′ ). We therefore only have to prove that no other clause is in this difference. On the converse, assume that
. The only effect of removing γ is that γ disappears from the set of clauses satisfied by ω; on the other hand, γ ′ is still there. As a result, the relationship between the set of satisfied clauses remains the same. Formally, two cases are possible: either ω satisfies all clauses that are satisfied by ω ′ , or ω ′ satisfies some clauses more. In the first case, the removal of γ does not change the relationship because ω still satisfies all clauses of ω ′ and γ ′ . In the second case, the sets of satisfied clauses are still incomparable, as ω ′ satisfies the same clauses, while ω satisfies γ ′ .
We have now all technical tools to prove the complexity of checking redundancy of a single clause in a set.
Theorem 12
Checking whether γ is conditionally redundant in Π is coNPcomplete.
Proof. Membership: a clause is redundant if and only if there exists two models such that their ordering is affected by the presence of the clause.
Hardness: the set of clauses Π is satisfiable if and only if the clause a is conditionally redundant in Σ = (a ∨ Π) ∪ {a}, where a ∨ Π is a shorthand for {a ∨ γ | γ ∈ Π}. We divide the proof in two parts: first, we consider the case in which Π is satisfiable, and prove that a is irredundant; second, we show that the irredundancy of a implies the satisfiability of Π.
If Π is satisfiable, it has a model ω X . We show that γ is irredundant in Σ by considering two models: the first one is ω, which is obtained by adding the evaluation a = false to ω X ; the second one is ω T , the model that sets all variables to true. The first model satisfies all clauses but a; the second model satisfies all clauses. As a result, we have that a is the only clause satisfied by ω T that is not satisfied by ω, that is: S Σ (ω T )\S Σ (ω) = {a}. By Lemma 10, this implies that a is irredundant.
Let us now assume that a is irredundant. By Lemma 10, S Σ (ω)\S Σ (ω ′ ) is equal to {a} for some pair of models ω and ω ′ . This condition implies that ω satisfies a while ω ′ does not. Since ω satisfies a we have that S Σ (ω) = Σ since all clauses of Σ contains a. As a result, S Σ (ω ′ ) = Σ\{a}, that is, ω ′ satisfies all clauses of a ∨ Π. Since ω ′ (a) = false, the model ω ′ satisfies all clauses of Π.
We now prove that checking whether a formula contains a redundant clause is coNP-complete as well. Note that the redundancy of a formula is defined as the presence of a redundant clause in the set, and not as the property of being equivalent to a proper subset. These two definitions are not equivalent, as shown by Theorem 11. Proof. Membership is proved as usual: we have to check the redundancy of some clause; these tests can be done in parallel, and therefore the whole problem is in coNP.
Hardness is proved as follows: we prove that the clause a is redundant in the following set Σ if and only if Π is unsatisfiable:
We indeed prove the following: first, all clauses but a are irredundant. Second, that a is redundant if and only if Π is satisfiable.
All clauses of Σ\{a} are irredundant. This is proved by showing, for each of them, a possible revising formula Γ such that Σ * Γ is different than Σ\{δ} * Γ for each clause δ of Σ that is not a.
¬c i ∨ a ∨ γ i . The formula is Γ = ¬a ∧ c i ∧ {¬c j | j = i}. This formula satisfies c i ∨ a and all clauses ¬c j ∨ a ∨ γ j , and falsifies a and all clauses c j ∨ a. As a result, the only clause that is not satisfied neither contradicted is ¬c i ∨ a ∨ γ i . As a result, the result of the revision entails γ i if and only if this clause is present.
c i ∨ a. We use the formula Γ = ¬a ∧ {¬c j | j = i} ∧ γ i . This formula falsifies a, all clauses c j ∨ a with j = i, and implies the clause ¬c i ∨ a ∨ γ i because of γ i , and all clauses ¬c i ∨ a ∨ γ j for any j = i because Γ |= ¬c j . As a result, the only clause that is not falsifies nor entailed is c i ∨ a. Its presence is needed to allow deriving ¬c i from the revised theory.
If Π is satisfiable a is irredundant. This is proved by showing a revising formula that makes a needed for the entailment of some formulae. Namely, since Π is satisfiable it has a model ω. Let Γ be defined as follows:
In words, we set all c i 's to true, and give to any x i the sign that is in the model ω. This formula is clearly satisfiable. Moreover, it is almost complete, since the only variable that is not forced to have a specific value is a. Moreover, Γ implies all clauses: ¬c i ∨a∨γ i is implied because ω satisfies all clauses γ i , while c i ∨ a is entailed because Γ contains c i .
On the other hand, a is not falsified nor it is entailed. As a result, the presence of a in the result of revision is related to its presence in the original theory.
If a is irredundant, Π is satisfiable. This is proved by using the characterization of irredundancy provided by Lemma 10: since a is irredundant, there exists two models ω and ω ′ such that:
Therefore, ω |= a and ω ′ |= a. We can now proceed by using the following rules:
1. every clause but a that is satisfied by ω is also satisfied by ω ′ (otherwise a would not be the only clause that is satisfied by ω but not by ω ′ );
2. every clause that is not satisfied by ω ′ is not satisfied by ω as well (same reason);
3. if a model satisfies some clauses, it also satisfies all their consequences.
This leads to the pictorial proof of Figure 1 .
In words, the proofs proceeds as follows, using the rules above and the fact that ω |= a and ω ′ |= a. The latter is equivalent to ω ′ |= ¬a. Since ω |= a we have that ω |= c i ∨ a. As a result, the same clause is satisfied
?
We can therefore conclude that all clauses of Σ but a are irredundant, and that a is redundant if and only if Π is unsatisfiable. As a result, Σ is redundant if and only if Π is unsatisfiable.
Conclusions
We have presented a study of the semantical and computational properties of concepts related to the redundancy of CNF propositional formulae. Namely, we have considered the problem of checking whether a formula is redundant and some problems related to removing redundancy from it. The computational analysis has shown that checking redundancy is coNP-complete. We have then defined an I.E.S. as an irredundant equivalent subset of a formula, and studied some problems related to I.E.S.'s: checking, size, uniqueness, and membership of clauses to some or all I.E.S.'s. All problems have been given an exact characterization within the polynomial hierarchy, that is, we have found classes these problems are complete for. The problem of redundancy has also been studied for the case of two alternative forms of equivalence based on particular sets of possible queries.
Some problems are still open. Namely, irredundancy is only one way of defining minimal representation of a formula, but other ones exist. In the Horn case, several different definitions of minimality have been used, both by Meier [Mai80] and by Ausiello et al. [ADS86] , including irredundancy and number of occurrences of literals. In the general (non-Horn) case, only the number of occurrences of literals (and, in this paper, irredundancy) have been considered. An open problem is whether the other notions of minimality used in the Horn case make sense in the general case as well.
Some other problems have not been considered in this paper, and are analyzed in two other papers. In the first one [Liba] , the complexity of the problem of redundancy has been analyzed for the case of Horn and 2CNF formulae. The analysis of 2CNF, in particular, has shown a very interesting pattern: while the properties of redundancy and irredundancy are different depending on whether the formula implies some literals or not, a concept of acyclicity makes often the difference between tractability and intractability. In the other paper [Libb] some non-classical logics have been considered: nonmonotonic logics, multi-valued logics, and logics for reasoning about actions. An interesting issue of non-classical logics is that equivalence can be defined in different ways, and that the irredundancy of all parts of a knowledge base does not always imply the irredundancy of the knowledge base.
